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Abstract 
Does return migration affect entrepreneurship? This question has important implications for the 
debate on the economic development effects of migration for origin countries. The existing 
literature has, however, not addressed how the estimation of the impact of return migration on 
entrepreneurship is affected by double unobservable migrant self-selection, both at the initial 
outward migration and at the final inward return migration stages. This paper uses a 
representative household survey conducted in Mozambique in order to address this research 
question. We exploit variation provided by displacement caused by civil war in Mozambique, 
as well as social unrest and other shocks in migrant destination countries. The results lend 
support to negative unobservable self-selection at both and each of the initial and return stages 
of migration, which results in an under-estimation of the effects of return migration on 
entrepreneurial outcomes when using a ‘naïve’ estimator not controlling for self-selection. 
Indeed, ‘naïve’ estimates point to a 13 pp increase in the probability of owning a business 
when there is a return migrant in the household relative to non-migrants only, whereas 
excluding the double effect of unobservable self-selection, this effect becomes significantly 
larger - between 24 pp and 29 pp, depending on the method of estimation and source of 
variation used.  
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1. Introduction 
International emigration has been traditionally regarded as detrimental to 
the origin countries of migrants. Most concerns relate to the type of ‘brain drain’ 
issues originally proposed by Gruber and Scott (1966) and Bhagwati and Hamada 
(1974), and refer to the loss of the most educated nationals of a country, which 
causes the disappearance of a critical mass in production, research, public services 
(notably health and education) and political institutions. This negative effect would 
be compounded by the presence of positive production externalities or 
complementarities between human capital and other factors of production. In 
addition, fiscal losses would occur in the form of foregone tax revenue when 
educated nationals leave the country. 
The effects of international migration on the economic development of 
migrant sender countries have, however, lately attracted renewed and considerable 
interest. In fact, recent studies have emphasized that emigration seems to have a 
positive impact on the educational attainment of both migrants and non-migrants, 
as well as on the demand for improved political institutions and on community 
engagement in the home country, as well as on international trade and FDI between 
the origin and destination countries of migrants.1  
It can be argued that an additional channel through which migration may 
directly benefit home countries is through the return of migrants, who can bring 
new productive skills (such as education or managerial capacity) acquired abroad, 
as well as financial resources provided by past remittances and accumulated 
savings.  
                                                      
 
1 See, for instance, Batista et al. (2012), Batista and Vicente (2011), Beine et al. (2008, 2011), 
Docquier et al. (2011), Gallego and Mendola (2013), Kugler and Rapoport (2007) and Javorcik et al. 
(2011). 
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While there are currently no systematic data on worldwide return 
migration, recent literature has focused on the international movements of students 
- the growing ‘brain circulation’ phenomenon.2 UNESCO (2011) numbers show 
that the stock of foreign tertiary students in countries for which data are available 
was greater than 3 million in 2009, which doubles the corresponding number in 
1999. Rosenzweig (2007) moreover argues that the proportion of foreign students 
who remain in the United States as permanent immigrants is only around 20% for 
the average sending country, which leaves a large room for ‘brain circulation’, i.e. 
the return of educated migrants to their origin country. In a different line of 
research, Gibson and McKenzie (2014) study New Zealand’s Recognized Seasonal 
Employer program, a temporary migration program that targets mainly unskilled 
workers. They accordingly find that migrants who return home tend to acquire 
human capital while abroad. 
Despite the recent intensified interest regarding both the development 
impact of international migration for migrant countries of origin, and the temporary 
nature of some international migratory movements, there has only been limited 
research on the entrepreneurial effects of return migration – a literature discussed 
towards the end of this section. Most importantly, the existing literature evaluating 
the entrepreneurial impact of return migration has not taken into account the role of 
migrant self-selection, both at the initial migration and at the return migration 
stages, which this paper shows to be a serious impediment to a causal estimation of 
this impact.3 
                                                      
 
2 Rosenzweig (2007) and Nyarko (2011) focus on the magnitude and effects of “brain circulation” 
from Asia and Ghana, respectively. 
3 Migrant self-selection on observable characteristics, notably education, has been a central topic of 
research since Borjas (1987) seminal work, notably followed by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) for 
return migration and Chiquiar and Hanson (2002) emphasizing the importance of migration costs. 
More recent work has focused on migrant self-selection based on unobservable characteristics of 
migrants. See, for instance, Coulon and Piracha (2005), Batista (2008), Akee (2010) and Bertoli et al. 
 
4 
In this paper we propose to examine the question of whether return 
migrants contribute to entrepreneurship in the origin country. For this purpose, we 
conducted a representative household survey in four provinces of Mozambique 
during September and October 2009, when 1766 respondents were interviewed for 
this purpose. The retrospective nature of our dataset, as well as the characteristics 
of the Mozambican context that has migrants departing to different locations 
subject to a variety of exogenous shocks, allows us to address the issue of 
unobservable self-selection of return migrants both at the (outward) initial 
migration and at the (inward) final return migration stages, unlike previous 
literature. The data we collected and use in this analysis also facilitates an 
examination of predominantly south-south migration flows (between Mozambique 
and neighboring sub-Saharan African countries), which have been mostly ignored 
due to data unavailability in the past economics migration literature. 
‘Naïve’ estimates of the entrepreneurial impact of return migration that do 
not take self-selection into account indicate that having a return migrant in the 
household contributes to increasing the probability of business ownership by nearly 
13 percentage points (pp). However, because we are focusing on entrepreneurial 
outcomes, our estimates are likely to be affected by unobservable self-selection of 
individuals, at both the initial migration and at the final return migration stages: 
potentially, migrants and return migrants will differ substantially from non-
migrants in terms of unobservable characteristics such as ability or entrepreneurial 
motivation, for instance, which should be correlated with entrepreneurial outcomes. 
Our results indeed highlight that the ‘naïve’ estimation results hide substantial 
unobservable self-selection bias. When we exclude the effect of migrant 
unobservable self-selection, both at the outward initial migration and at the inward 
                                                                                                                                         
 
(2013) using instrumental variable techniques, and McKenzie et al. (2010) using quasi-experimental 
evidence. Note, however, that all these articles control for self-selection using income data only.  
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return stages, the impact of return migration on the probability of owning a 
business is estimated to be significantly larger: between 24 pp and 29 pp, 
depending on the method of estimation and source of variation that is used. 
Note that, in order to identify migrant self-selection at the various stages, 
we use different sources of variation, such as displacement caused by wars and 
other violent events, and macroeconomic shocks affecting differently origin and 
destination countries. Using these different sources of variation and also various 
estimation methods, namely next-neighbor matching and instrumental variable 
estimation, we obtain evidence of negative unobservable self-selection at both and 
each of the initial and return migration stages. Clearly, there seems to be an overall 
positive entrepreneurial effect of return migration, particularly after accounting for 
outward and inward unobservable self-selection. 
Our work is most importantly related to a few relatively recent articles 
exploring the relationship between migration and entrepreneurship. Similarly to 
Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002), we examine the occupational choice of return 
migrants, although we compare the decisions of return migrants and non-migrants 
instead of focusing on the determinants of the decisions to return and to become an 
entrepreneur. We are closer to McCormick and Wahba (2001), Mesnard (2004), 
Mesnard and Ravallion (2006) and Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) in that they 
focus on examining the role of migration in overcoming wealth and credit 
constraints for businesses ownership. However, we take a broader perspective in 
that we look at the overall importance of return migration in promoting business 
ownership and explicitly tackle self-selection issues. Vadean and Piracha (2010) 
and Wahba and Zenou (2012) both find, for Albania and Egypt, respectively, that 
return migration seems to promote entrepreneurship after an initial migrant re-
integration period. However, even though both these papers mention the problem 
of the endogeneity of migration, they never discuss this problem thoroughly or 
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address the fact that there are multiple stages of self-selection in the decisions of a 
return migrant that may complicate causal estimation of the effects of return 
migration on entrepreneurship – this is exactly the focus and novelty of our paper, 
which discusses unobservable self-selection at both the initial migration and the 
return stages, while controlling for this problem using different sources of variation 
and estimation methods. Finally, Yang (2008) explores exogenous variation in 
Filipino migrant income caused by the 1997 Asian financial crisis to find a positive 
impact of migrant income on investment and entrepreneurial activities in the home 
country. He however recognizes that this positive impact may be mediated by a 
number of channels, namely remittances, migrant savings or return migration. In 
this paper, we attempt to isolate the impact of return migration. In addition, further 
to controlling for self-selection in the decision to return, we also attempt to control 
for self-selection in the initial decision to migrate. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
begin by presenting a brief overview of Mozambique. We then proceed, in section 
3, by describing the household survey we conducted and use in our empirical work, 
including a discussion of descriptive statistics. In section 4, we present the 
econometric model and identification strategy adopted in our empirical analysis. 
Section 5 discusses the main empirical findings, including a variety of robustness 
checks. Finally, section 6 summarizes our findings and presents policy 
implications. 
2. Mozambique: Country Context 
Mozambique, a country with 22.4 million inhabitants, is one of the poorest 
countries in the world with a GDP per capita of 838 USD in 2008. 4 Indeed, it ranks 
                                                      
 
4 World Development Indicators, 2009. 
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161 in 189 countries (latest available years) in terms of GDP per capita.5 Without 
important natural resources until recently, and with 81% of the population directly 
dependent on agriculture,6 it has been an aid-dependent country for many years, 
with official aid assistance accounting for 22% of GNI in 2008.7 
Politically, Mozambique became independent from Portugal in 1975, after 
an independence war that started in 1964 and officially ended in 1974. FRELIMO 
(Frente de Libertação de Moçambique), the independence movement, then started a 
single-party, socialist regime supported by the former Soviet Union and its allies. 
Starting in 1977, Mozambique suffered a devastating civil war fought between 
FRELIMO and RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana). RENAMO was 
supported by Apartheid South Africa and, in the context of the Cold War, by the 
United States. The civil war ended in 1992 with an agreement to hold multi-party 
elections. FRELIMO has won all presidential elections since then. 
Migratory movements from Mozambique were traditionally labor-driven 
mainly from the southern Mozambican provinces to South African mines and 
commercial farms. More recently, emigration from Mozambique has frequently 
been related to political instability. At independence, in 1975, most Portuguese 
citizens residing in Mozambique until this time returned to Portugal. During the 
subsequent civil war, mainly in the 1980s, large refugee movements were 
generated into neighboring countries. After 1992, peace in Mozambique attracted 
back over 1.7 million of its refugees and former combatant emigrants. More 
recently, in May and June 2008, xenophobic attacks in South Africa, against some 
of the poorest foreign immigrants (mostly Mozambican and Zimbabwean) resulted 
in the deaths of more than 60 people and prompted further substantial return 
                                                      
 
5 World Development Indicators, 2009. 
6 CIA World Factbook, 2010. 
7 World Development Indicators, 2009. 
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migrant movements. Official reports point to 40,000 people fleeing back to 
Mozambique immediately after the onset of the violence.8 
3. Data description 
3.1. Household survey  
This study is based on a representative household survey including 
modules on business ownership and international migration. The survey was 
conducted in four provinces of Mozambique (Cabo Delgado, Zambezia, Gaza, and 
Maputo-Province) from September 2009 to October 2009 by the CSAE at the 
University of Oxford.9 
The locations covered in the survey, 161 in total, were selected following a 
standard two-stage clustered representative sampling procedure - first on provinces, 
then on enumeration areas. The sampling framework was the 2004 electoral map of 
the country using as weights the number of registered voters per polling location 
(usually schools) as provided by the CNE/STAE (2004) in their 2004 elections 
(disaggregated) electoral data electronic publication.10 This sampling procedure 
implies that all registered voters in the universe under consideration had the same 
probability of being sampled. The survey is based on a sample of 1763 resident 
households (including both non-migrants and return migrants), and also provides 
information on a large sample of current emigrants. Sampling in each enumeration 
area followed standard household representativeness (nth house calls). However, 
only household heads or their spouses, one per household, were interviewed. 
Interviews were also conditional on ‘having access to a cell phone’ for receiving or 
sending calls and text messages. This included cases in which there was no 
                                                      
 
8 Red Cross of Mozambique (2009). 
9 Figure A1 in Appendix illustrates the geographical coverage of the household survey. 
10 Comissão Nacional de Eleições - Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral (2004). Note 
that the 2009 electoral map only became available when fieldwork was already ongoing. 
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ownership of cell phones in the household, but easy access to a neighbor or family 
member allowing cell phone usage.11 
3.2. Descriptive statistics 
The dataset highlights the importance of international migration in 
Mozambique. Table 1 shows that 33% of all households in the sample have at least 
one member who is currently or has been an international migrant - while 23% of 
all sampled families has at least on return migrant living in the family home. Table 
1 also shows that, in terms of business ownership, 28% of families in our sample 
report owning a business - 14% of which businesses are owned by return migrants.  
[Table 1 about here.] 
Table 2 indicates that an overwhelming fraction of return migrants (72%) 
travelled to South Africa from Mozambique. There are, however, significant 
numbers of return migrants that departed to Tanzania (9%) and Malawi (7%). Most 
other migrant destinations are in Africa, while only less than 5% of Mozambican 
migrants head to Europe (mostly Germany and Portugal). This geographic pattern 
of migration implies that this paper will essentially examine south-south migration 
flows.  
[Table 2 about here.] 
Table 3 shows the summary statistics for all the variables used in the 
regression analysis that follows and not yet described in Tables 1 and 2. We find 
that the surveyed households are predominantly rural (only 29% are within 5km of 
a town), have relatively young household heads with low levels of education (close 
                                                      
 
11 According to UNCTAD (2010), more than 80% of the Mozambican population had cell phone 
coverage in 2009. During fieldwork, having access to a cell phone proved an undemanding 
requirement on respondents, with only 3% of interviews not being completed due to lack of access to 
a cell phone. 
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to 6 years of schooling, on average), expenditure (approximately 4 USD/day) and 
asset ownership. Further, around 15% of households report receiving remittances. 
[Table 3 about here.] 
4. Econometric Framework and Identification Strategy  
Econometric framework 
Given that one cannot simultaneously observe the actual and the counterfactual 
entrepreneurial outcomes for each individual in our sample given their return 
migration status (and hence one cannot directly measure the individual 
entrepreneurial gain of return migration for this individual), we need to estimate an 
average entrepreneurial effect of return migration. This effect can be described as:
 1 0 0 0
E 1 E 0
E 1 E 1 E 0
i i i i
i i i i i i i
E R = E R =
E E R = E R = E R =
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (1) 
where Ei and Ri  are binary variables denoting, respectively, the entrepreneurial 
outcome and return migration status of individual i; E1i  denotes the entrepreneurial 
outcome for a return migrant ( Ri =1 ); and E0i  represents the entrepreneurial 
outcome for a non-migrant ( Ri = 0 ). 
Equation (1) shows that estimating average entrepreneurial effects can be 
problematic. Indeed, this expression makes clear that simply comparing the 
average difference in entrepreneurial outcomes between return migrants and non-
migrants will not identify a causal effect of return migration on entrepreneurship. 
Indeed, the causal effect of interest, the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) 
effect, E E1i − E0i Ri =1"#
$
% , is shown to be masked by a Selection Bias that 
highlights that there would be differences in entrepreneurial outcomes between 
non-migrants and return migrants even if the latter had chosen not to emigrate in 
the first place.  
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An example of selection bias occurs when those who choose to emigrate are 
broadly more “able”, which could mean that they are more educated, motivated and 
driven than those who do not emigrate – all characteristics that should improve 
their entrepreneurial outcomes. In this instance, there is a positive selection bias, 
which implies that simply comparing average differences in entrepreneurial 
outcomes between return migrants and non-migrants exaggerates the true 
entrepreneurial skill gains of return migrants. Conversely, a negative selection bias 
(occurring if, for example, it is those individuals who lack observable 
qualifications, such as education, or are less hard-working that decide to leave the 
origin country and, afterwards, return home) will understate the true 
entrepreneurial skill gains of return migrants when simply comparing average 
differences in entrepreneurial outcomes between return migrants and non-migrants. 
Note that the sign of self-selection is very much an empirical question: it is a priori 
equally possible to have negative self-selection or positive self-selection. 
An additional issue is that the self-selection of migrants at any of the two 
relevant stages (initial or return migration) might occur based on observable or 
unobservable variables. Up to recently, the literature on migrant self-selection as 
started by Borjas (1987) based on Roy (1951), focused exclusively on self-
selection based on observable characteristics, such as education and income. As 
examined by more recent migration research12, unobservable migrant self-selection 
often operates based on unobservable personality traits, for instance, which are 
very likely to be correlated with our outcome of interest, entrepreneurship.13 
                                                      
 
12 See, for instance, Coulon and Piracha (2005), Batista (2008), Akee (2010), McKenzie et al. (2010) 
or Bertoli et al. (2013). 
13 Batista and Umblijs (2013) present robust evidence that less risk-averse immigrants tend indeed to 
be more entrepreneurial. 
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Identification strategy 
In order to devise an identification strategy for our parameter of interest, it 
is important to examine the nature of the selection bias occurring in our case. The 
thought experiment we should keep in mind can be summarized as: “What would 
be the estimated impact of return migration on entrepreneurial outcomes if we 
could choose to send abroad and bring back individuals who were randomly 
selected from the population of non-migrants?”  
This question makes clear that there are two implicit selection problems in 
this thought experiment: first, randomly select a non-migrant and send her abroad; 
second, from the pool of randomly selected migrants, randomly choose some of 
them to return to the origin country. This thought experiment would then avoid the 
two types of selection issues arising with return migration: (1) (outward) self-
selection at the initial migration stage, which refers to the potentially idiosyncratic 
characteristics of those who decide to leave the country; (2) (inward) self-selection 
at the return migration stage, which refers to the potentially idiosyncratic 
characteristics of those migrants who decide to return to the sending country. 
Given the expected self-selection of individuals into migration and return 
migration, the identification challenge is first to find comparable return migrants 
and non-migrants on observable and unobservable characteristics before the initial 
migration decision is made; and second, within this restricted sample, to find 
comparable return migrants and current migrants on observable and unobservable 
characteristics before the return migration decision is made. 
We propose to use war events in the history of Mozambique as exclusion 
restrictions to create the exogenous variation that allows us to simulate a randomly 
selected sample of outward migrants from the pool of all individuals in our sample. 
Given the political context described in Section 2, it seems reasonable to expect 
that individuals who left Mozambique at the time of the independence and civil 
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wars were migrating primarily as a result of events beyond their control - they were 
hence likely forced to leave the country independently of their characteristics.  
In the same way, we choose to use events of forced return migration in 
order to generate a random sample of return migrants from the existing pool of 
migrants. In particular, the sample of return migrants is restricted, at this stage, to 
those who returned from South Africa immediately after the sudden eruption of the 
violent xenophobic riots against immigrants described in Section 2, as well as to 
those who were deported due to their illegal migration status14, and also to those 
who return to the origin country because of illnesses or deaths in the family. All of 
these return motives are likely to be exogenous in the sense that they are typically 
unanticipated and outside the individual’s control. They should hence be 
uncorrelated with the individual’s entrepreneurial outcomes except through the fact 
that these motives prompted the return itself. 
An alternative identification strategy to randomly choose return migrants 
from the existing pool of migrants is to use the exogenous variation provided by 
changes in the GDP per capita difference between destination and origin countries, 
as well as the distance between the migrant origin and destination areas. GDP 
differentials provide economic incentives to move back to the origin country as 
incomes change between origin and destination, whereas distance between migrant 
origin and destination also has predictive power for return migration decisions. 
Both these variables are exogenous in the sense that they are completely outside 
individual control and should not, therefore, be systematically correlated with 
migrant characteristics. 
                                                      
 
14 Note that illegal migration status is widespread in the Mozambican immigrant community residing 
in South Africa. 
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Estimation strategy 
The simplest possible estimate of the entrepreneurial gains to return 
migration would be obtained from a regression of the following form: 
 0 1 2i i iE R Xα α α εʹ′= + + +  (2) 
where Ei  is a proxy for entrepreneurship by individual i in our sample, such as 
business ownership or self-employment; Ri  denotes whether individual i is a return 
migrant; and X  denotes a set of observable individual, household and 
geographical characteristics that potentially affect entrepreneurial activity. 
Following the discussion of the econometric framework summarized by 
(1), we know that an estimate for α1 will only be equal to the causal effect of 
interest if the selection bias disappears after conditioning on observable 
characteristics X, i.e. if E E0i X ,Ri =1!"
#
$= E E0i X ,Ri = 0
!
"
#
$ . This is, however, 
unlikely to be the case, as the return migrant status, Ri , is most often correlated 
with the error term εi , which may include unobservable characteristics such as 
motivation, ambition, work diligence or risk preferences. These unobservable 
characteristics can be expected to affect both the actual entrepreneurial outcomes 
of non-migrants and the counterfactual outcomes of return migrants had they 
decided not to migrate and return, hence creating an unobservable self-selection 
bias in this ‘naïve’ estimate.  
Following the identification strategy discussed above, we will therefore 
pursue a few alternative estimation strategies in order to obtain estimates of the 
causal parameters of interest regarding the entrepreneurial outcomes of return 
migrants relative to those of non-migrants. 
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First, we will use OLS estimation on samples restricted following the 
identification exercises proposed in the previous sub-section, so as to isolate 
selection bias effects and obtain an estimate for the causal effect of return 
migration on entrepreneurship. 
Second, an alternative estimation method to obtain the causal effect of 
return migration on entrepreneurship (that can also be used to evaluate robustness 
of the results of running OLS on the restricted samples) will be to conduct nearest-
neighbor matching (NNM) estimations. 
An additional method to estimate the overall causal effect of interest, 
which can also be used to examine the robustness of our findings relative to inward 
self-selection, is to perform a two-stage least square estimation of equation (2).  
The outcomes of these estimation strategies are discussed in the next 
section. 
5. Empirical analysis  
In this section, we summarize the main empirical results in this paper. In 
particular, we present, interpret and discuss the robustness of our estimates of the 
‘entrepreneurial gains’ of return migration.  
Main empirical results 
The entrepreneurial outcome we examine in the baseline results is business 
ownership at the household level. Table 4 displays the least squares estimates of 
the likelihood of business ownership for households that have at least one return 
migrant relative to households with no migrants.15 These estimates are obtained 
                                                      
 
15 Note that we present least squares estimates for simplicity. Running the same regressions 
using Probit yields essentially the same results. 
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while controlling for: (i) characteristics of the household and household head that 
may affect business ownership, such as the age and gender of the household head, 
as well as maximum completed education and number of persons belonging to the 
household; (ii) household level proxies for financial resource availability that may 
limit the possibilities of opening and running a business, such as household 
expenditure and asset ownership (where we focus on the most durable and 
precisely measured, namely home, land and car ownership); and, finally, (iii) 
geographical control variables such as migration destination, urban area and 
province fixed effects.16 
[Table 4 about here.] 
Column (1) in Table 4 shows that having a return migrant in the family 
seems to significantly increase the probability of owning a business. Our least 
squares estimates point to an average increase in the probability of business 
creation by 12.5 pp when there is a return migrant in the household. The magnitude 
and statistical significance of this estimate is unaffected when we include controls 
for current migrants and remittances being received in the household, as shown in 
Column (2) of Table 4. While it could be argued that the entrepreneurial effects of 
current migrants and remittances could be captured to some extent by the return 
migrant variable, this does not seem to be the case in any of the specifications we 
run, where the estimated coefficient on return migration is always pretty much 
unaffected by the inclusion of these control variables. 
As discussed in the previous section, our ‘naïve’ OLS estimate of a 12.5 pp 
increase in the probability of business creation when there is a return migrant in the 
household is likely combining the true effects of return migration on business 
                                                      
 
16 Fixed effects were only included for the two main migrant destinations in our sample: South Africa 
and other African countries. 
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ownership with the effects of unobservable self-selection. For this reason, we next 
use OLS estimation on restricted samples as described in the identification strategy, 
with the purpose of excluding the various types of selection bias effects and 
obtaining an estimate for the causal effect of return migration on entrepreneurship.  
We start by restricting the return migrant sample to “war migrants”, i.e. 
those return migrants who left Mozambique during wartime, as this migration 
decision is much less likely to be influenced by unobservable characteristics than 
the typical migration decision. This exercise should allow evaluating the effects of 
unobservable outward self-selection at the initial migration stage - which can be 
done by simply comparing the ‘naïve’ OLS estimates for the whole sample to the 
OLS estimates for this restricted sample. 
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 4 present the least squares estimates of 
regression (2) when restricting the subsample of return migrants to those who left 
the country during war time. The estimated results show that there seems to be 
evidence of overall negative outward self-selection as the estimated impact of 
return migration on entrepreneurship is significantly raised when we restrict the 
estimation sample to war migrants compared to the estimation based on the whole 
sample of return migrants. These results can be understood in the context of the 
long history of Mozambican migration to South African mines and farms in non-
war times. This history implies that strong migrant networks can lower migration 
costs and improve employment prospects even for those migrants with lower 
unobservable ability. 
Following our estimation strategy, we now proceed to further restrict the 
estimation sample of war migrants to include only individuals whose return was 
forced by exogenous motives - including the sudden eruption of violent 
xenophobic riots against foreign immigrants in South Africa, as well as deportation 
due to illegal migration status (widespread in the Mozambican immigrant 
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community), or illnesses and deaths in the family. This further sample restriction 
should allow us to evaluate the overall unobservable self-selection at both the 
initial and return migration stages, as well as to isolate unobservable inward self-
selection at the return migration stage. 
Columns (5) and (6) in Table 4 show that return migrants who left 
Mozambique in war times and were forced to return by an exogenous motive are 
24 pp more likely to own a business than non-migrants. This implies that there is 
overall strong negative unobservable self-selection when we consider both the 
initial and return migration stages, as the coefficient from the ‘naïve’ OLS 
estimation nearly doubles relative to the restricted sample estimation. 
This 24 pp estimate is our proposed empirical counterpart to the ideal 
counterfactual thought experiment of assessing the true entrepreneurial gains of 
return migration by picking a random sample of non-migrants to emigrate and then 
picking a random subsample of those emigrants to bring back to the origin country. 
This is, hence, our proposed baseline estimate for the true entrepreneurial gains 
from return migration excluding unobservable self-selection at both migration 
stages. 
Comparing this 24 pp estimate to the 14 pp estimate when restricting the 
sample of return migrants to those who emigrated during war times, we can 
evaluate the unobservable inward self-selection of return migrants applicable to a 
sample of non-selected emigrants, such as war migrants. This self-selection pattern 
is clearly negative, implying that it is less able war migrants that self-select to 
return to the origin country.  
Our results underscore the importance of controlling for both types of 
unobservable self-selection in estimating the entrepreneurial effect of return 
migration. 
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When running OLS on equation (2) using a restricted subsample that 
includes only those return migrants who were forced to return from the sample of 
all emigrants (i.e. including emigrants who left the country at war and non-war 
times), estimates for the entrepreneurial gains of return migration cannot be 
precisely estimated, as shown in Columns (7) and (8) of Table 4. We cannot 
therefore infer the pattern of unobservable inward self-selection for return migrants 
in general using our sample. 
Robustness check: Nearest-Neighbor Matching Estimation 
A possible concern with the estimation strategy used in our baseline results 
might be that the use of linear regressions (or indeed Probit regressions, which 
yield the same qualitative results) is too restrictive to identify the parameter of 
interest. To this effect, we redo our estimation of the average treatment effect 
(ATE) of return migration on the probability of owning a business, but now using a 
non-parametric matching method. The purpose of this procedure is to investigate 
whether results are sensitive to the linear approximation embedded in OLS. This 
matching approach ensures that return migrants are only compared to non-migrants 
who are sufficiently similar to them in terms of observables. To implement this 
approach, we rely on the nearest-neighbor matching (NMM) procedure proposed 
by Abadie and Imbens (2006).  
 [Table 5 about here.] 
The results shown in Table 5 are obtained from carrying out the same 
estimations as presented in Table 4 but using NNM methods. The NNM results 
confirm the OLS results. The estimated average treatment effects are very similar 
in magnitude and statistical significance to those produced using OLS methods for 
the various estimation samples used.  
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Specifically, in the unrestricted sample, Column (1) of Table 5 shows that 
the ‘naïve’ estimate for the increase in the probability of return migrants owning a 
business is 11 pp, which compares to 12.5 pp in the OLS estimation.  
When restricting the sample to those return migrants who initially left the 
country in times of war, this coefficient is raised to 19 pp, as can be seen in 
Column (2) of Table 5. This point estimate is higher than the 14 pp provided by the 
OLS results, but similarly provides evidence supportive of negative unobservable 
outward selection at the initial migration stage. 
After restricting the sample to those migrants who were forced to leave due 
to war and forced to return due to reasons beyond their control, the estimated effect 
of migration on entrepreneurial outcomes becomes 27 pp, as shown in Column (3) 
of Table 5. This compares to the 24 pp estimate using OLS, although the NMM is a 
slightly less statistically significant estimate due to the reduction in sample size 
imposed by the common support imposed in the NMM estimation. This still 
underscores the importance of controlling for both types of migration self-
selection, and strengthens the findings from the OLS estimated coefficients 
according to which overall unobservable self-selection at both stages of migration 
is negative, and a compound effect of both negative unobservable self-selection at 
the initial and at the return migration stages.  
Exactly as happened when using OLS estimation on our sample of 
migrants, NMM cannot provide statistically significant estimates for the 
entrepreneurial gains from exogenous return migration from the pool of existing 
migrants (including both those who migrated at war and at non-war times). We 
therefore still cannot infer the pattern of unobservable inward self-selection for 
return migrants in general using our sample. 
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Robustness check: Instrumental Variable Estimation 
An alternative way to randomly choose return migrants from the existing 
pool of migrants, and in this way evaluate the unobservable inward self-selection 
bias occurring at the return migration stage, is to use an instrumental variable (IV) 
estimator for the α1 parameter of interest in model (2). For this purpose, we need to 
find instruments that are strongly correlated with the decision to return and 
uncorrelated with the decision to own a business in the home country.  
We propose to use the second set of exclusion restrictions described in the 
identification strategy section of the paper. Namely, we construct instrumental 
variables that make use of the exogenous variation provided by shocks to GDP per 
capita in the migrant destination countries, as well as by differences in the distance 
between areas of residence and migrant destinations. 
Variation at the individual level for the relative GDP per capita variable at 
migrant destination relative to the origin is achieved in the following way. The 
instrumental variable is computed as a weighted average, where weights are 
constructed in order to reflect the relative size of the Mozambican migrant 
population in each migrant destination – a proxy for existing migration networks at 
each destination.17 This migration-weighted GDP variable is matched to individual 
migrants in the sample in the year that they turn 30, which is the age at which 
individuals are most likely to start a business.18 Note that the IPUMS census 
information from the Minnesota Population Centre (2010) is only available for 
                                                      
 
17 These weights are computed as the number of Mozambican nationals between the ages of 25 and 
34 resident at destination, as a proportion of the non-migrant resident population at the same 
destination. The weights are established using Mozambican and national IPUMS census data from 
the Minnesota Population Centre (2010). 
18 Note that changing the year at which individual migrants are matched with the GDP weighted 
variable by one or two years does not make a difference for the validity of the instrumental variables 
nor the estimation results that are obtained. 
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migrants to South Africa, Tanzania and Portugal, which together account for 82% 
of the total number of return migrants in the sample.19 
It seems reasonable to expect that changes in relative GDP per capita 
between origin and destination countries are unanticipated and outside the 
migrants’ control. This relative income variable should hence be uncorrelated with 
the migrants’ choice to own a business at origin, except through the fact that this 
motive prompts the return itself – as it is likely that these relative income changes 
provide economic incentives for return migration decisions.  In the same way, it is 
also expectable that the distance between survey districts and migrant destinations 
has predictive power for return migration, but should not be directly correlated 
with the decision to own a business, except through the fact that it prompts the 
return migration decision itself.  
[Table 6 about here.] 
The statistics obtained in our sample and displayed in Table 6 provide 
evidence supportive for these IV rationales. Looking at the full sample, the 
destination-distance and relative GDP per capita instruments are each and both 
together significantly correlated with the decision to return, as required of a strong 
instrument and confirmed by the Kleinberg-Papp F-statistics reported in Columns 
(1) – (3) of Table 6. These instruments also seem uncorrelated with the decision to 
own a business in the origin country and indeed pass the tests of over-identifying 
restrictions shown in Column (3) of Table 6. 
The instrumental variable estimation results obtained using both these 
sources of variation shown in Column (3) of Table 6 show a positive and 
statistically significant point estimate of 21 pp for the incremental impact of return 
                                                      
 
19 The distance measures are naturally available for all migrants, while in constructing the migration-
weighted GDP variable we are constrained by the IPUMS census data availability, which is restricted 
to South Africa, Tanzania and Portugal only among the Mozambican migrant destinations. 
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migration on business ownership. This is our preferred IV specification in that it 
uses both instruments and thereby attenuates any concerns regarding the local 
validity of each of these instruments when used separately – even though the 
estimation results do not vary substantially when using each set of instruments. 
Indeed, one observes that using only the distance IV points to a slightly lower but 
significant impact of return migrants – 18 pp as displayed in Column (1) of Table 
6, whereas using only relative GDP increases the magnitude of this estimate, but 
cannot estimate it precisely on its own as is clear from Column (2) of Table 6. 
In any event, it seems clear that any of these instrumental variable 
estimation strategies point to estimates much larger than the ‘naïve’ OLS estimates 
on the full sample, which is evidence supportive of negative unobservable inward 
migrant self-selection at the return migration stage. This is equivalent to say that 
return migrants from the existing pool of current migrants seem to be generally less 
entrepreneurial in terms of non-observable characteristics than randomly chosen 
existing migrants. 
We next turn to restricting the IV estimation sample to those migrants who 
initially left at war times, in an attempt to focus on a sample of migrants who are 
less likely to be self-selected than the average migrant in our sample, as discussed 
before. Focusing on this sample of war migrants, while also accounting for self-
selection at the return migration stage by using an IV strategy, should allow us to 
identify the effect of return migration on business ownership while minimizing 
unobservable self-selection concerns at both the initial and return migration stages. 
As shown in columns (4)-(6) of Table 6, while the lower number of observations 
decreases the F-statistics for these instruments, the estimation results are in line 
with the ones observed using the two alternative estimation methods we proposed 
before: indeed the coefficient of 29 pp obtained for the increased probability of a 
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return migrant owning a business relative to a non-migrant is significantly positive 
and larger than the ‘naïve’ OLS estimates.  
These results lend further support to negative unobservable self-selection 
at both and each of the initial and return stages of migration. This unobservable 
self-selection pattern results in an under-estimation of the effects of return 
migration on entrepreneurial outcomes when using the ‘naïve’ OLS estimator. 
Clearly, there seems to be an overall positive entrepreneurial effect of return 
migration, particularly after accounting for outward and inward unobservable self-
selection. 
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper examines broad research questions related to the entrepreneurial 
impact of return migration. More precisely, it evaluates the effect of sending 
random national residents abroad and then randomly bringing them back to the 
origin country, while also evaluating the benefits of bringing an average existing 
migrant back. For this purpose, we conducted and make use of a tailored 
representative household survey of Mozambique. This is a typical Southern 
African country in the sense that migratory flows are mostly directed at 
neighboring countries. We hence also indirectly ask the important question of 
whether Southern Africa’s growth promise may be supported by the current 
substantial south-south migration flows in the area. 
Our methodological contribution highlights the importance of going 
beyond simple ‘naïve’ comparisons of entrepreneurial outcomes between return 
migrants and non-migrants in order to avoid estimation biases related to 
unobservable self-selection of migrants. Indeed, because we are focusing on 
entrepreneurship, our estimates could potentially be rather sensitive to 
unobservable self-selection of individuals into initial migration and subsequent 
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return migration: migrants and return migrants may differ substantially from non-
migrants in terms of unobservable characteristics correlated with entrepreneurial 
outcomes, such as ability or motivational drive, for instance. 
In order to identify migrant self-selection at these various stages, we use 
different sources of variation, namely displacement caused by wars and other 
violent events, but also macroeconomic shocks at destination and physical distance 
between migrant origin and destination. Using these different sources of variation 
and also various estimation methods, we obtain evidence of negative unobservable 
self-selection at both and each of the initial and return migration stages. 
Conducting ‘naïve’ OLS estimation shows that being a return migrant is 
associated with a significant increase of 13 percentage points in the probability of 
owning a business relative to non-migrants. However, when we exclude the effect 
of unobservable self-selection, both at the outward initial migration and at the 
inward return stages, we obtain that this effect is significantly larger and significant 
- between 24 pp and 29 pp, depending on the method of estimation and source of 
variation that are used. The fact that we use alternative, totally distinct sources of 
variation that yield the same qualitative results and quantitative estimates of similar 
magnitude is reassuring regarding the validity of our analysis. 
In light of our results, policymakers (particularly those in similar neighboring 
countries where labor movements are often forced and happen as a result of 
violence and conflict) should feel encouraged to design temporary migration 
programs that can better serve the interests of both origin and destination countries. 
For example, lotteries granting migrant visas for temporary work permits could 
plausibly be proposed for sub-Saharan African countries that already see large 
numbers of migrants moving mostly informally to South Africa and the Middle 
East.  Moreover, while further studies on other source countries are required to 
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make a stronger general argument, for this case at least, keeping the doors of richer 
countries open to migration may be regarded as a form of “efficient aid”. 
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Table 1: Household Characteristics. All Households. Percentages. 
 
Migratory 
Experience 
Households with at least one migrant 32.73 
Households with at least one current 
migrant 15.77 
Households with at least one return 
migrant 23.03 
  
 
Business 
Ownership 
Households with at least one business 28.42 
Households with at least one business-
owning return migrant 3.97 
Source: Own survey. 
	  
	  
	  
	   	  
 
 
 
Table 2: Destination Countries of Return Migrants. 
Most Recent Migration Journey. Percentages. 
South Africa 72.38 
Tanzania 8.78 
Malawi 6.64 
Swaziland 2.57 
Zimbabwe 2.36 
Other African 1.07 
Germany 1.93 
Portugal 1.28 
Other European 1.07 
Cuba 1.07 
Other 0.86 
Number of 
Observations 467 
Source: Own survey.   
  
 
  
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics. All Households. 
Variables  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Business  ownership, % 1,763 28.42 45.11 0 100 
HH Head Age 1,747 37.62 13.58 15 88 
HH Maximum Years of Schooling 1,760 6.62 4.08 0 19 
HH Size, Total Number of Persons 1,762 5.87 2.85 0 29 
HH Expenditure, MZN per day 1,674 128.83 164.03 0 2,381 
Asset Ownership, % 1,762 7.78 26.79 0 100 
Remittance Receipts, % 1,763 15.48 36.19 0 100 
Province,  Cabo Delgado,  % 1,763 25.41 43.55 0 100 
Province,  Zambezia,  % 1,763 24.96 43.29 0 100 
Province,  Maputo, % 1,763 24.9 43.26 0 100 
Province,  Gaza,  % 1,763 24.73 43.16 0 100 
Proximity to urban area ≤ 5Km,  % 1,763 28.59 45.2 0 100 
Source: Own survey.  
 
 
	  
Table 4: Probability of owning a business. All households. OLS estimates. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Full Sample Full Sample War Migrants War Migrants 
War Migrants + 
Forced Return 
War Migrants  + 
Forced Return Forced Return Forced Return 
Return migrant in household, dummy 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.138** 0.141** 0.240** 0.243** 0.118 0.119 
  (0.047) (0.048) (0.063) (0.063) (0.099) (0.100) (0.102) (0.102) 
Age of household head, years  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Gender of household head, female -0.048** -0.046** -0.045* -0.046** -0.056** -0.058*** -0.050** -0.050** 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Max education in household, years -0.008** -0.008** -0.009** -0.009** -0.008** -0.009** -0.008* -0.008* 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Household size, persons 0.007* 0.007* 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.007 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Expenditure, MZN/day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset ownership, dummy 0.159*** 0.161*** 0.191*** 0.194*** 0.182*** 0.184*** 0.170*** 0.171*** 
 
(0.049) (0.049) (0.053) (0.053) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) 
Migrant destination: South Africa, dummy -0.145** -0.139** -0.151* -0.155* -0.067 -0.056 -0.009 -0.001 
 
(0.062) (0.062) (0.089) (0.090) (0.204) (0.210) (0.143) (0.144) 
Migrant destination: Other African, dummy -0.422*** -0.426*** -0.437*** -0.440*** -0.495*** -0.501*** -0.368*** -0.373*** 
 
(0.071) (0.072) (0.094) (0.094) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) 
Current migrant in household, dummy 
 
0.017 
 
0.041 
 
0.068 
 
0.055 
  
(0.035) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.044) 
Remittances received, dummy 
 
-0.056* 
 
-0.044 
 
-0.089* 
 
-0.097** 
    (0.033)   (0.045)   (0.050)   (0.049) 
Urban, Province Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 1,658 1,658 1,416 1,416 1,305 1,305 1,328 1,328 
Standard errors reported in parentheses, clustered at the enumeration area level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
	  
Table 5: Probability of owning a business. NMM estimates. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Full Sample War Migrants War Migrants + Forced Return 
Forced 
Return 
Return migrant - ATE 0.11** 0.19** 0.27* 0.02 
  (0.06) (0.09) (0.15) (0.14) 
Observations 1149 1083 505 1034 
Note: All regressions use a matching estimator proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2006) and 
implemented in Stata through the nnmatch command.  Common support is established prior to each 
matching exercise by refining the sample after running logit regressions on restricted sub-samples. 
Controls are the same as in the fuller OLS specifications. Standard errors reported in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
 
  
 
	  
 
Table 6: Probability of owning a business. 2SLS estimates. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
War 
Migrants 
War 
Migrants 
War 
Migrants 
Return migrant in household, dummy 0.177** 0.464 0.213** 0.217** 0.635 0.287** 
  (0.083) (0.309) (0.095) (0.108) (0.619) (0.122) 
Age of household head, years  -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Gender of household head, female -0.045** -0.047* -0.052** -0.042* -0.038 -0.043* 
 
(0.022) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.027) (0.024) 
Max education in household, years -0.008** -0.011** -0.009** -0.009** -0.012** -0.010** 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Household size, persons 0.007* 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.003 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Expenditure, MZN/day 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset ownership, dummy 0.160*** 0.146*** 0.145*** 0.192*** 0.150*** 0.149*** 
 
(0.048) (0.052) (0.050) (0.053) (0.057) (0.054) 
Migrant destination: South Africa, dummy -0.194** -0.500* -0.262** -0.226* -0.665 -0.335** 
 
(0.084) (0.291) (0.105) (0.120) (0.570) (0.132) 
Migrant destination: Other African, dummy -0.467*** -0.862*** -0.634*** -0.512*** -1.036* -0.715*** 
 
(0.089) (0.285) (0.096) (0.123) (0.579) (0.124) 
Urban, Province Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
IV Set  A B A+B A B A+B 
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 13.7 12.52 11.25 10.51 6.51 9.17 
Hansen J-Test (p-value) - - 0.58 - - 0.68 
Observations 1,658 1,304 1,304 1,416 1,234 1,234 
IV Set A: Distance between residence in Mozambique and migrant destination.  
IV Set B: Ratio between GDP per capita in Mozambique and in migrant destinations.  
See text for detailed explanation on IV construction.  
Standard errors reported in parentheses, clustered at the enumeration area level.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
 
	  
Appendix  
 
 
 
Figure A1: Geographical coverage of 
household survey. 
 
 
Sources:  Diva,  2010 
and ArcGIS. 
 
 
 
 
